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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the implications of the European single currency within a simple sticky price
intertemporal model.  The main issue we focus on is how the euro may alter the responsiveness of consumer
prices to exchange rate changes.  Our central conjectures is that the acceptance of the euro will lead
European prices to become more insulated from exchange-rate volatility, much the way U.S. consumer
prices already are.  We show that this has profound consequences for both the volatility and levels of
macroeconomic aggregates in both the U.S. and Europe.  We find that European welfare is enhanced, and,
more surprisingly, that the U.S. shares in Europe’s good fortune.  Alternative assumptions about how
pricing behavior will change lead to different conclusions, but in all cases we can derive specific implications
for expected levels and volatility of macroeconomic variables.  
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Introduction
The implementation of the single currency in Europe, to take full effect in January
2002, has received a great deal of attention from the public, the press and the academic
literature. Much of the academic literature has discussed the question of whether Europe is an
`optimal currency area', in the sense of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963).
2 This literature
has assumed that the main effect of the adoption of the euro is to fix permanently the currency
exchange rates in Europe. The emphasis has been on the incremental increase in the stability
of the exchange rate system when the single currency is finally fully adopted.
Another strand of the academic literature shares the popular view that the adoption of
the Euro is a more fundamental change. For instance, this literature has explored the role of
the euro as an international currency (see Hartmann (1996) and Portes and Rey (1998)).
While at present world trade and financial flows are carried out predominantly in US dollars,
the relative importance of the dollar may diminish as the euro becomes more widely
acceptable in international transactions. The euro may become a `vehicle currency' which
competes with the US dollar, just as the US dollar in a previous epoch competed with (and
eventually replaced) the use of sterling.
We focus on one aspect of the adoption of the euro as an international currency that
has heretofore been neglected, but which has potentially significant effects for
macroeconomic stability. When Europe becomes integrated into a single large currency area,
approximately equal in size to the U.S., it is likely that Euro consumer prices will become as
insulated in the short run from exchange-rate changes, as indeed U.S. prices have been, since
the dollar became the major vehicle currency. It is easy to understand this shift from a
transactions-cost perspective. Take the situation of a retail firm that markets US goods in
Europe.  When there are a dozen European currencies within the EMU, the firm faces two
                                                     
2 See for instance Eichengreen (1992),  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), De Grauwe (1994), Obstfeld
and Peri (1998).2
types of costs when exchange rates fluctuate. On the one hand, there are menu costs from
altering the price that consumers pay, as the exchange rate changes. This encourages the firm
to keep prices stable in consumers’ currencies. But if prices are set in the consumers’
currencies, and the firm is purchasing goods directly from US exporters, who set their prices
in dollars, its profits will be exposed to exchange-rate volatility. With a dozen European
currencies, the firm selling U.S. goods in Europe would need a dozen pricing decisions, and a
dozen exchange-rate hedging operations. These transactions costs would tend to tilt firms
toward stabilizing prices in dollar terms, which would mean that the prices consumers pay
would be more sensitive to changes in the dollar exchange rate.
When Europe is consolidated into a single-currency area, the accounting costs for
pricing in the European consumers’ currency are reduced considerably. For example, it is
more likely that U.S. exports will be invoiced in euros. (Currently, there is an asymmetry such
that U.S. exports to Europe are heavily invoiced in dollars, but European exports to the U.S.
are also invoiced in dollars. See ECU Institute (1995).) Giovannini (1988) observes that the
currency of export price invoicing is important for the pass-through of exchange rate changes
to goods prices. But even if U.S. export price invoicing does not change, multinational
marketers are more likely to view Europe as a single marketing area and will develop pricing
plans in terms of euros.
3  The importance of the euro as a payment and invoicing currency
has recently been recognized by the European Central Bank:
``..increasing use of the euro as a payment/vehicle and pricing/quotation currency
..could make the euro area Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) less sensitive, in
the short run, to US dollar exchange rate movements. … If euro area exports and imports are
increasingly invoiced in euro, the short-term effects of exchange rate changes on the goods
and services trade balance should be generally reduced
4 ”
We explore this issue within an international macro model with sticky nominal prices,
so that the currency of denomination of imported consumer goods has real effects on
                                                     
3 Much as IKEA sets dollar prices for the entire U.S. market (see Haskel and Wolf (1999)).3
macroeconomic aggregates and welfare.  Our central conjecture is that the introduction of the
euro will insulate European consumer goods prices from exchange rate changes. As a
consequence, the introduction of the euro will affect the volatility of real money balances, and
in turn macro aggregates such as consumption, in Europe. There are two effects that work in
opposite directions. First, the impact of European money shocks on the European real money
supply is magnified after the adoption of the euro. Pre-euro, when prices of imported U.S.
goods are more responsive to exchange-rate changes, there is an automatic stabilizer in effect.
If there is, for example, an increase in the money supply in Europe, European currencies
depreciate, raising the price that Europeans pay for U.S. goods. The real money supply rises
by less than the nominal money supply. That cushioning effect vanishes if euro prices do not
respond to exchange rate changes. Working the other way, U.S. money shocks also are
directly transmitted to the aggregate price level in Europe, pre-euro, through exchange rates.
That channel of real monetary instability is eliminated to the extent that euro prices are
unresponsive to dollar exchange-rate movements.
If European and U.S. monetary shocks are about equal in size, and less than perfectly
correlated, the introduction of the euro will increase real monetary instability in Europe.
Intuitively, pre-euro there is a sort of diversification effect when European prices respond
quickly to the exchange rate.  The variance of a weighted sum of European and U.S. money
shocks determines European real money volatility.  Some of the European monetary variance
is dissipated through exchange-rate changes, while the exchange rate transmits some of the
U.S. monetary variance. But when the exchange-rate effect on European prices diminishes,
the diversification effect dwindles. In the extreme case of no short-run price response to
exchange-rate changes, European real money variance is determined by the variance of
European money shocks (which is greater than the variance of a weighted sum of European
and U.S. shocks).  If this constituted the entire effect of the euro, then European consumers
would be worse  off  (and U.S.  consumers  would be unaffected).
                                                                                                                                                       
4 European Central Bank (1999).4
But there is a second channel through which the euro affects welfare. Our model
follows Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) in that goods prices are set optimally, taking into account
the stochastic environment that is faced by the firms. This implies that the introduction of the
euro will alter not just the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates, but through the adjustment
of goods prices, change the expected values of these aggregates (see Devereux and Engel
(1998)).  We find that the introduction of the euro increases expected aggregate consumption
in Europe, through a relative-price stabilizing effect. As Rogoff (1996) has noted “short-term
exchange volatility point(s) to financial factors such as changes in portfolio preferences,
short-term asset price bubbles, and monetary shocks. Such shocks can have substantial effects
on the real economy in the presence of sticky nominal wages and prices.” In particular, before
the advent of the euro, prices paid by consumers for imported goods are excessively volatile.
They respond to exchange rates changes which, in the short run, do not reflect real demand
and supply factors, but rather are reacting as asset prices to financial market shocks. We find
that when prices are stabilized in euros and unresponsive in the short run to exchange rate
fluctuations, the elimination of the volatility of relative prices of imported to domestically-
produced goods enhances expected consumption and welfare.
Since our model is utility based, we can ask how the euro affects expected utility of
U.S. and European consumers. We find for Europeans that the positive effects from the
reduction in relative-price volatility outweigh the increase in real monetary volatility. Some
simple numerical calibrations indicate that the gains to Europe from the introduction of the
euro are substantial when compared, for example, to the gains that might accrue from
elimination all monetary variability.
A common view of the coming of the euro is that while Europe will gain, the U.S.
must be a loser.
5  On the contrary, we find that the U.S. shares in Europe’s good fortune. The
channels that reduce relative price volatility and insulate Europe from U.S. monetary shocks
are reflected in increased asset prices. To the extent that Americans are diversified
                                                     
5 For example, Portes and Rey (1998) and Bergsten (1999).5
internationally – our model assumes full diversification for simplicity – their portfolio of
assets will also increase in value.
We briefly explore the implications of alternative assumptions about how pricing
might change. We examine the possibility that, to the contrary of our leading assumption,
U.S. prices may become more sensitive to exchange rate changes (while European prices
either remain as sensitive, or become less responsive.) Our welfare conclusions in some
circumstances change substantially depending on the pattern of pricing behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the basic model. Section
2 derives our central positive results, the welfare impact being discussed in section 3. Section
4 discusses a variant of the model where US firms are constrained to set identical dollar prices
for domestic sales and exports. Section 5 allows pre-euro Europe to have floating exchange
rates. Section 6 discusses alternative changes in pricing practices that may follow from the
euro. A numerical example is presented in section 7, and conclusions follow.
1. The Model
Our framework consists of a general equilibrium model in which the world is made of
two regions, the United States and Europe. Each region is populated by a continuum of
households. We normalize the world population to 1, and assume that households over the
) , 0 [ n  interval are residents of the United States, while households over the  ] 1 , [n  interval live
in Europe. There also exists a continuum of firms in both regions, with the number of firms in
each region equal to the number of households. Within each region, firms are owned by the
domestic households. Our framework is characterized by monopolistic competition: each firm
is the sole producer of a particular brand, which is an imperfect substitute for the other
available brands. Firms therefore enjoy a degree of monopoly power in pricing.
Throughout the analysis, there is only one currency used in the United States, namely
the US dollar. By contrast, there are initially several currencies in use in Europe, which are6
replaced by a unique currency, the euro. To simplify the exposition, we consider Europe as
one region, and present our results in terms of European wide per capita values. We could
instead write the model by considering a number N of European countries. Note however that
once the euro has been introduced, all European countries have the same currency and are
identical. Furthermore, in the main part of our analysis, we assume that pre-euro European
countries follow a fixed exchange rate regime.  This implies that the economic situation is the
same in all European countries,
6 and nothing is lost by focusing on European wide aggregates.
In each country, there is a monetary authority, and the money supply fluctuates
stochastically. Before the introduction of the euro, each European country has its own
monetary authority, whose behavior may be constrained by the requirements of fixed intra-
European exchange rate. With the set-up of the single currency area, European money supply
is taken over by the European Central Bank.
1.1. Households
Households obtain utility from consumption and the liquidity services provided by
holdings of real balances, but incur disutility from working.  The objective of household x,
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where  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β   is the discount factor,  0 > ρ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
and η  and χ  are positive scaling parameters.  ) (x Ci  is a consumption basket defined below,
) (x Li  is the number of hours worked,  ) (x M i  denotes the holdings of domestic currency and
k
i P  is the price of one unit of the basket consumed in region i, expressed in terms of region k
currency (k = eur denotes a price in the European currency, whereas k = dol denotes a price in
                                                     
6 Our analysis does not consider the case of asymmetric shocks across European countries. In such a
case, the economic situation wouldn’t be homogeneous within Europe.7
US dollars). This is a quite a special utility function, with a linear cost of effort. But it has the
appeal that it allows us to derived closed form solutions for consumption and welfare in the
face of uncertainty in money supply and differences in pricing arrangements across countries.
The consumption basket  ) (x Ci  is a composite of goods produced in the United
















where  ) (x Cij  is the consumption by household x, living in region i, of the goods produced in
region j.  We denote the United States as region 1 and Europe as region 2. The elasticity of
substitution between goods from different regions is equal to unity. Each region specific
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where  ) , ( v x Cij  is the consumption by household x, living in region i, of the brand produced
by firm v in region j. The elasticity of substitution between brands produced within a region is
λ , which we assume to be greater than 1.
Consumption allocation
The optimal allocation of a given overall consumption basket  ) (x Ci  across the





































































































where  ) (v P
k
ij  is the price, expressed in region k currency, charged in region i for brand v
produced in region j. 
k
ij P  is the price index, expressed in region k currency, charged in region



























































We now turn to the conditions describing the optimal inter-temporal choice of
households. We assume that there are complete asset markets, so that residents of each
country can purchase state-contingent nominal bonds.
7  As all households are identical within
each region, we can drop the x index and interpret the variables as per-capita variables. The
























where  12 S  is the exchange rate between the US dollar and the European currency (number of
US dollar per unit of European currency), the latter being a basket of European currencies
before the introduction of the euro, and the euro itself thereafter. (1.4) shows that
consumption will differ across the two regions only to the extent that there are changes in the
real exchange rate. Intuitively, the optimal risk sharing implies that an additional unit of any
                                                     
7 As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) emphasize, the structure of the utility functions ensures that
consumption risk is completely shared when the law of one price holds.  But in general, as we see
below, the law of one price will not hold.  In the absence of complete markets, this would imply a time
varying distribution of wealth among countries, and movements in the current account.  To incorporate
an endogenous wealth distribution with incomplete markets would enormously complicate the analysis
of the world equilibrium, probably without giving a lot of further insight the issues addressed here.
The redistributive effect of financial markets without risk sharing is likely to a relatively minor factor,
from a welfare perspective.  It is for this reason that as a first pass at this problem, one is justified in
ignoring market incompleteness.9
currency has the same marginal utility regardless of the nationality of the household receiving













































where  it W  is the nominal wage rate.
1.2. Government
The government in each country issues money and makes transfers to residents.
Money supply in the United States is set independently of European money supplies.
European money supplies are identical if intra-European exchange rates are initially fixed.
Seignorage revenue is repaid to households as a lump sum transfer,  it T :
it it it T M M + = − 1 .
1.3. Firms and retailers
1.3.1 Structure of the distribution channel
We assume that goods produced by firms reach the consumers in two steps. In a first
step, firms sell their goods to retailers in both countries at wholesale prices. In a second step,
retailers in each country sell the goods purchased from domestic and foreign firms to the
consumers living in the country, charging retail prices. The distinction between firms and
retailers allows us to separate the invoicing of exports from the degree to which consumer
prices are affected by exchange rate fluctuations. We consider that there is a representative10
retailer in each country that behaves competitively. The retailer doesn’t incur any cost in
addition to the wholesale cost of the goods she buys, and her profits are repaid to the
households in her country as a lump sum transfer.
1.3.2. Demand and profits
The demand faced by a retailer for a particular brand v is obtained by aggregating the
consumption demands (1.2) across all households in the region. As the retailers simply carry






























































         




         

































where  ) (v Yi  is the total output of the firm producing brand v and located in country i. It
consists of the goods sold in the United States,  ) ( 1 v Y i , and the goods sold in Europe,  ) ( 2 v Y i .
An important feature of (1.7) is that the demand is determined by the consumer (retail) prices,
denoted by P. The wholesale prices charged by the firms, that we denote by Q,  do have an
indirect impact on (1.7) as they affect the retail prices. But pattern of consumption is affected
by the exchange rate only if there is some pass-through to retail prices. The presence of pass-
through to wholesale prices is not sufficient for this to occur.
We assume that firms use a linear production function through which one hour of
labor yields one unit of output. Denoting the profits of a firm producing brand v in region i by
) (v i Π , we write:
(1.8)
) ( ] ) ( [ ) ( ] ) ( [ ) (
) ( ] ) ( [ ) ( ] ) ( [ ) (
22 2 22 12 2 12 2
21 1 21 11 1 11 1
v Y W v Q v Y W v Q v
v Y W v Q v Y W v Q v
eur eur
dol dol
− + − = Π
− + − = Π11
where  ) (v Q
k
ij  is the wholesale price, expressed in the region k currency, charged by firm v,
located in region j, for its goods shipped to the retailer in region i. Total profits are the sum of
profits from the United States market and profits from the European market. Note that profits
are separable across markets, so that if the firm can set different prices in different markets, its
choice for the price charge in the United States is unaffected by conditions in Europe.
1.3.3. The currency of price setting
Prices must be set prior to the realization of shocks. We consider that firms always set
the wholesales prices in their own currency, for sales to both the domestic and foreign
retailers. By contrast, retailers can set the retail prices either in the consumers currency, in
which case they bear the exchange rate risk, or in the currency used by the firm, in which case
the exchange rate risk is passed through to the consumers.
8 Because of the complexities of
dealing with multiple menu costs, we do not attempt to directly model the optimal choice of
currency of price setting for retail firms.   The intuition developed in the introduction, and the
excerpt from the European Central Bank bulletin strongly suggests however, that the euro will
lead European marketers to stabilize the prices of imported goods in euro’s.  Therefore, we
investigate the impact of the euro in the post-adjustment phase, in which a substantial degree
of pricing of U.S.-manufactured goods in Europe has switched from dollar-denomination to
euro-denomination. More specifically, pre-euro, the European retailer sets the retail prices of
imported goods in dollar terms, but once the euro is  introduced retail prices  are set in euro.
Therefore, the effect of  the euro is to reduce the sensitivity of European consumer prices to
fluctuations in the exchange rate. The euro does not affect the pricing of goods sold in the US,
where imported retail goods are  set in dollar terms, before and after the euro.
9
Our distinction between firms and retailers allows us to separate the invoicing of
exports from the sensitivity of consumer prices to exchange rate fluctuations.  Therefore,
                                                     
8 Such a distinction is irrelevant for domestic sales, as the consumers and the firm use the same
currency.12
consumer prices can be stabilized in local currency, even though exporters invoice their goods
in their own domestic currency
10. Table 1 summarizes the currency in which prices are set, as
well as the degree of exchange rate pass-through.
Table 1: Currency of Pricing







United States Europe US dollar Complete
Europe United States European cur. Complete







United States Europe US dollar Complete
Europe United States US dollar Zero







United States Europe Euro Zero
Europe United States US dollar Zero
As retailers behave competitively, their expected discounted profits are zero. The
retail prices, conditional on the wholesale prices, are then obtained from the zero profit
                                                                                                                                                       
9 For evidence on this, see Engel and Rogers (1996).
10 Our set-up is therefore consistent with the observation of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) that the terms
of trade is negatively correlated with the exchange rate.   While there is no exchange rate pass-through
on consumer prices when retailers set them in the local currency,  prices paid by the retailers for the
imported goods react to fluctuations of the exchange rate as wholesale prices are set in the producers
currency.  Therefore the wholesale terms of trade is  negatively correlated with the exchange rate.13
condition. The objective of the firms is to maximize their expected discounted profits.
Retailers and firms are owned by the domestic residents,
11 implying that the expected profits
are evaluated using the households’ contingent nominal interest rate.
Before the euro
The US retailer chooses prices in US dollars for the brands she sells. The price for
domestic brand v is written as  ) ( 11 v P
dol , and the price for imported brand v is  ) ( 12 v P
dol . As
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The domestic retail price is identical to the wholesale price, and the retail price for an
imported brand is the wholesale price corrected by the expected exchange rate, adjusted for
the marginal utility of income.
The European retailer chooses a price in US dollars for imported brands,  ) ( 21 v P
dol
t ,
that is converted to European currency to obtain the consumer price. She also chooses a price
in European currency,  ) ( 22 v P
eur
t , for European brands. The Appendix shows that the retail
prices are simply equal to the wholesale prices:









We now turn to the optimization problem of the producing firms themselves. A US
firm chooses two different wholesale prices, both denominated in US dollars. One,  ) ( 11 v Q
dol ,
is charged to the domestic retailer, and the other,  ) ( 21 v Q
dol , is charged to the European retailer.
The firm chooses the wholesale prices by taking into account their impact on retail prices and
                                                     
11 This is done without loss of generality: the assumption of complete markets, reflected in the optimal
risk sharing condition (1.4), implies that the firms’ optimal choices are unaffected by the country of
residence of their owners.14
the demand by consumers. As shown in the Appendix, the resulting retail prices are written as











































Equations (1.9) and (1.10) indicate that in general the firm will not set prices at their
certainty equivalent level ( t t W E 1 1
1 ) 1 ( −
− − λ λ ). Focusing on (1.9), the covariance between the
US wage and 
ρ − 1
1t C   affects the price. Intuitively, the firm maximizes the expected value of
nominal profits, weighted by the consumer’s marginal utility of money. In general, the firm
chooses a price which represents the best trade-off between the states in which it would want
to set a high price ex post against those states in which it would want a low price ex post. The
term 
ρ − 1
1t C  captures the total demand facing the firm, evaluated at the consumer’s marginal
utility of money. If the covariance between  t W1  and 
ρ − 1
1t C  is negative, the marginal cost tends
to be low in states when the firm’s demand evaluated at the marginal utility of money is high.
But these are the states about which the firm’s owner cares most. In such states, the firm
would set a low price ex-post if it could. Prices being pre-set, the firm sets a price that is
below the certainty equivalent value, so as to more closely approximate the ex post profit
maximizing pricing policy for the states it cares most about. The same intuition can be used to
explain the pricing equation (1.10).
A European firm chooses two different wholesale prices in European currency:
) ( 22 v Q
eur
t , charged to the European retailer, and  ) ( 12 v Q
eur
t , charged to the US retailer. The
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A similar intuition can be given for the pricing equations (1.11)-(1.12) as was given
for equation (1.9). All firms being identical within a region, per capita employment (output)
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After the euro
The introduction of the euro does not affect the prices chosen by the US retailer.
Similarly, the European retail prices for domestic goods are determined using the same rule as
before. The only change occurs for the European retail prices of US goods, which are now set
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Turning to the producing firms, the optimization problem of a European producer is
unchanged, and the resulting retail prices for European goods in the US and Europe remain
determined by (1.11) and (1.12). Similarly, the retail price of US goods in the US is still given
by (1.9). The change of the pricing rule for imports by the European retailer affects the
optimal export wholesale price charged by the US firm,  ) ( 21 v Q
dol
t . The Appendix shows that
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European employment is given by (1.13), whereas US employment becomes:




















n Y L − + = =16
2. The impact of the euro on consumption and employment
2.1. Monetary shocks and consumption determination
We assume that monetary shocks are the only source of volatility in the model, and












In addition, we assume that  it M follows an independent, log-normal distribution, for
each i.
12  Letting lower-case letters be logs, this implies that:
1 1 + + + = it it it m m ν
where  it ν  has mean 
2 5 . 0 ln
i i ν σ µ + − and variance 
2
i ν σ .  In order to focus on the impact of the
euro solely through currency of pricing, we consider that the growth rate and volatility of
money shocks is unaffected by the euro, and is identical in the US and Europe: so that
µ µ µ = = 2 1 , and 
2 2 2
2 1 v v v σ σ σ = = . In the pre-euro situation, the exchange rate pegging
between European countries implies that money supplies are equalized across countries. As
money supplies are log normal, all variables in our models follow a log normal distribution.
Throughout the paper, lower case letters denote logs ( Z z ln = ) and the variances /
covariances across log variables are denoted by:  ] [ ] [ ] [ y E z E zy E zy − = σ .
Under these assumptions, it is easy to verify from the money demand equations, (1.5)
that the nominal discount factor  1 + it td E , is constant in each region and equal to βµ
13. This











                                                     
12 None of the main results depend on the fact that monetary shocks are independent across countries
under flexible exchange rates. This assumption merely simplifies the exposition.17










Before the introduction of the euro, US consumer prices are entirely predetermined.
By contrast, European consumer prices are affected by monetary shocks through the exchange











































































where  ∝  denotes a relation of proportionality. US consumption is entirely insulated from
European money shocks, because the retail prices for imports from Europe are set in dollars.
But European consumption responds to US money shocks through exchange rate adjustment.
After the introduction of the euro, US consumption is still determined by (2.3),































The major results of the analysis are presented in Table 2, and detailed in the
Appendix. We start with the variance of log consumption in the US and Europe. Before the
introduction of the euro, European consumption must be less volatile than US consumption.
This reflects the cushioning role of the exchange rate pass-through on real variables. A
monetary expansion in Europe increases the nominal balances of European consumers. But it
                                                                                                                                                       
13 Although money supply shocks do affect consumption, they do so in a way that leaves the term
1






it it t P C P C E
ρ ρ unaffected. Thus, the nominal interest rate is not affected by random walk
money shocks, given the specification of preferences used.18
also leads to a depreciation of the European currency, which partially reduces the purchasing
power of European consumers through imported inflation. This effect disappears with the
introduction of the euro, as retail prices for imports from the US are now set in euro so there
is no exchange rate pass-through to consumers. Table 2 shows that the introduction of the
euro increases the volatility of European consumption, while leaving US consumption
volatility unchanged.
On this measure alone, it would seem that the introduction of the euro would make
Europeans worse off, while having no implications for US welfare. But welfare cannot be
measured only by consumption variance. This is because the stochastic properties of
exchange rate regimes also has implications for the expected values of consumption and
output, as discussed in Devereux and Engel (1998). In order to do a full welfare analysis, we
must therefore compute the expected values of consumption and employment.
2.3. Expected consumption
Before the euro
We can use the pricing equations (1.9) and (1.10), the risk-sharing relationship (1.4),
the labor supply equation (1.6) and the definitions of the price index (1.3) to write the two






































































These equations can be solved by utilizing the fact that since the money supply follows a log
normal distribution, then so will consumption.19
Table 2 shows that in both regions an increase in consumption volatility increases
expected consumption if  1 > ρ . To highlight the intuition behind this result, we point out that
from labor supply (1.6) the nominal wage in the United States is proportional to 
ρ
t C1 . Then,
from (1.9), we see that if  1 > ρ , the marginal cost is negatively correlated with the firms
marginal utility-discounted demand 
ρ − 1
1t C , and firms set their prices below the certainty
equivalent values. Since consumption is proportional to real balances, low prices result in
higher consumption.
Expected consumption in Europe however is negatively related to exchange rate
volatility. For both US and European producers, exchange rate volatility increases the
variance of marginal cost, given  t C2 . This induces them to raise their prices charged for sales




t P P 21 11 < ), thereby reducing expected European
consumption. The presence of this additional channel in Europe therefore implies that
expected consumption is lower in Europe than in the United States before the euro, as shown
in Table 2.
After the euro
After the introduction of the euro, the European retail price for imports from the US is
given by (1.14) instead of (1.10). The expected US consumption is still determined by (2.6).

















which replaces (2.7). Table 2 shows that expected consumption is not affected in the United
States. By contrast, the effect of exchange rate volatility on European expected consumption
disappears, as US exporters now set their prices in euro. The removal of the direct impact of
exchange rate volatility reinforces the effect of the higher European consumption volatility,
and the introduction of the euro boosts expected consumption in Europe.20
2.4. Expected employment
Expected employment can be computed by combining (1.13) and (1.15) with our
results for expected consumption. The Appendix establishes that expected employment is the
same for the United States and Europe, and is given by the following equation, both before
and after the introduction of the euro:
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Table 2 shows that the introduction of the euro reduces expected employment, in both
countries. Expected employment in each region is just the sum of US and European
household’s consumption of that region’s good. Expected employment falls because expected




2 1 t t C E ) falls.
At first glance this seems paradoxical; expected composite consumption in Europe
rises, but expected consumption of each element in the composite falls.  But it important to
remember that composite consumption is not a linear function of the consumption of each
region’s good. We can derive the following relation between the aggregate consumption
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n n
C E C E
n n
C E
 Before the introduction of the euro, exchange rate fluctuations affect the relative price of
domestic and imported consumption, since 
2
22 21 ) / ( s t t c c Var σ = . This depresses expected
composite consumption.  The introduction of the euro eliminates this effect.  While the
expected consumption of each good falls, this is more than offset by the removal of the effects
of exchange rate volatility (which increases the volatility of consumption of domestic and
imported goods), so that expected composite consumption rises.
Figure 1 illustrates the point, with domestic and imported consumption on the
horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. Indifference curves connect all possible pairs of21
domestic and imported consumption giving the same overall consumption basket. Figure 1
presents two such curves, 
A C C =  and 
B C C = , with 
B C  giving higher utility than 
A C .
The figure contrasts two cases. In the first case, exchange rate volatility is large, and the
economy can be either at point A or at point B, the aggregate consumption basket being equal
to 
A C  at either point. The expected consumption of domestic and imported goods is given by
) (
A dom C C  and  ) (
A imp C C  respectively. The second case is characterized by a lower
exchange rate volatility, and the economy can be at point C or at point D. At either point, the
aggregate consumption basket 
B C  is larger than in the previous case.  But the expected
consumption of each good,  ) (
B dom C C  and  ) (
B imp C C , is smaller.
3. The welfare effects of the euro
We now examine the impact on welfare. Expected utility depends upon consumption,
real money balances, and labor supply. But following recent literature (e.g. Corsetti and
Pesenti, 1998), we focus on the expected utility of consumption and labor supply alone,
abstracting from the role of real balances. The Appendix shows that the expected utility for
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How does the introduction of the euro affect expected utility? To see the effects, we
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For the US, the introduction of the euro affects neither expected consumption nor
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2 1 t t C E  is reduced by the introduction of the euro.





2 1 t t C E  falls, the expected utility of consumption rises, and by the same token, the
fall in expected employment also raises expected utility.  Thus Europeans must gain.  How
about expected utility in the US?  While expected consumption and consumption variance in
the US is unchanged, the fall in expected employment must also raise expected utility in the
US.  Thus, the introduction of the euro raises welfare in both Europe and the US!
Our model therefore shows that the introduction of the euro is not a zero-sum game in
which any European gain would be mirrored by a loss for the United States. Instead, both
regions benefit. Therefore, paradoxically, the role of the US dollar as the world currency is
actually detrimental for US welfare, when the alternative is a world where consumer prices
are stabilized in local currencies.
4. The law of one price for US exports
In the pre-euro environment, US firms were free to choose different wholesale prices
for their sales to the domestic and foreign retailers. This assumption might be questioned. For
example anti-dumping laws could make it difficult for US firms to set different prices in a
given currency. We could alternatively assume that US firms must set the same US dollar




t = ). The Appendix presents the analysis
under this alternative setup, and the results are summarized in Table 3. The results regarding
consumption volatility are unchanged. Compared to the baseline model, the pre-euro expected23
consumption is lower in the United States and higher in Europe. The introduction of the euro
will then increase expected consumption in both regions. It also reduces effort in both regions.
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both before and after the euro, and it is lowered by the introduction of the euro. Then, from
(3.1) and (3.2), we can again show that both regions benefit, hence the main message of the
paper remains unaltered.
5. Exchange rate flexibility in pre-euro Europe
We have so far assumed that European countries pegged their exchange rates vis a vis
one another in the lead-up to the launching of the euro. This is a fairly accurate description of
the reality, but it interesting to ask how the situation would differ if intra-European exchange
rates were flexible before the euro. As in the previous section, we would envisage that there
are conflicting effects. On the one hand, exchange rate volatility stabilizes domestic
consumption when imported goods are priced in the foreign currency. But on the other hand,
exchange rate volatility depresses expected consumption.
To explore these separate effects, we can analyze a version of our model where the
world consists of three countries: the United States, of size n, Germany, of size n2 and France,
of size n3=1-n- n2. The analysis is outlined in the Appendix, and the results are presented in
Table 4. The introduction of the euro now has two effects. In addition of the effect through
pricing of goods that we have analyzed so far, the euro brings a fixed exchange rate regime at
the intra-European level.
The intra-European exchange rate regime has no effect on the volatility and expected
level of US consumption. Table 4 shows that expected employment is higher in the pre-euro
era, relative to the baseline model of Table 2. The positive welfare impact of the euro on US
residents is then larger when the intra-European exchange rate is initially flexible.24
For Europe, the situation is more complex. Assuming that the intra-European
exchange rate fluctuations are passed-through to consumer prices before the euro,
14 Table 4
shows that the flexible intra-European exchange rate reduces expected consumption in Europe
in the pre-euro era. As this is only partially offset by the lower volatility of consumption, a
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2 1 t t C E  is reduced, the later effect being
stronger than in the baseline model. From (3.1) and (3.2) we see that the benefits of the
introduction of the euro are actually stronger when the intra-European exchange rate is
initially floating. Intuitively, the benefits from the introduction of the euro per se are
reinforced by the benefits from pegging the intra-European exchange rate.
6. Alternative assumptions regarding the currency of pricing
So far we have assumed that the euro would alter the pricing behavior of the
European retailer, inducing her to set imported retail prices in euro. Perhaps however the
influence of the euro will lead the US retailer, instead of her European counterpart, to adjust
her pricing practices. What would be the situation if the US retailer sets the retail prices for
imports from Europe in euro, thereby passing the exchange rate fluctuations through to US
consumers?
In this alternative scenario, the results are in fact very different. The derivations
proceed as before, save for the fact that US consumption is now exposed to exchange rate
risk. The analysis is detailed in the Appendix and the results are presented in Table 5. As
consumer prices are effected by the exchange rate in both countries, the introduction of the
euro reduces consumption volatility in the United States and leaves it unchanged in Europe.
The expected consumption level is determined by (2.7) for Europe and by a similar relation
                                                     
14 As the situation is symmetric across European countries, firms end up choosing the same price, in
their currency, for exports and domestic sales.25
for the United States. The Appendix shows that the PPP holds, and consumption is always
equalized across the two regions. Now, as shown in Table 5,  the introduction of the euro does
not affect expected consumption in Europe, but reduces it in the United States. Expected








1 1 t t C E  increases. (3.1) and (3.2) then
lead us to conclude that the introduction of the euro has a detrimental welfare effect, both for
Europe and the United States. It is especially detrimental to US residents, as the reduction of
expected consumption is added to the cost of higher effort.
Therefore, if the post-euro world is characterized by complete exchange rate pass-
through to consumer prices, the introduction of the euro has an adverse effect worldwide. In
such a case, the United States indeed does benefit from the dominant role of the dollar in the
pre-euro era.
7. A numerical illustration
We now illustrate our findings by computing the magnitude of the effects on
consumption, output and welfare. In order to focus on the role of price setting, we reasonably
assume that the United States and Europe have the same size (n=0.5). We set the standard
deviation of money shocks to 3.5% ( 035 . 0 = v σ ,  001225 . 0
2 = v σ ), and compute the effects
 for various values of  1 > ρ , which is the empirically relevant range. For brevity, we focus on
the baseline case where the euro induces US firms to set their prices for European
consumption in euro instead of US dollars.
Figure 2 presents the percentage change in expected consumption brought by the
introduction of the euro. Expected consumption isn’t affected in the United States and is
increased in Europe. If  2 = ρ , the euro boosts expected consumption by 0.02% in Europe.
Figure 3 illustrates the reduction in expected employment, which is identical in both regions.
If  2 = ρ , the introduction of the euro reduces expected employment by 0.004%.26
Figure 4 presents the welfare gain. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we
express the gain as a percentage of the gain that would result from removing monetary
volatility entirely ( 0
2 = v σ ). We can see that the gain is quite sizable: if  2 = ρ , the
introduction of the euro brings a gain equal to 27.9 % of the gain from completely removing
monetary variability for Europe.  The corresponding figure for the United States is 10.2 %.
Another perspective on the welfare gain from the euro is to compute the reduction in
money volatility that would bring the same welfare gain, without the euro, as the gain brought
by the euro, for a given volatility. We can show that if  2 = ρ , the benefit from the
introduction of the euro for Europe is equivalent to a 15 % reduction in the standard deviation
of monetary shock worldwide. The corresponding figure for the United States is a 5 %
reduction of the standard deviation.
8. Conclusions
This paper has shown that the introduction of the euro could have important positive
and normative effects for both Europe and the rest of the world.  In the case where the euro
causes a change in the retail pricing of U.S. imports in Europe, our central conjecture, the
advent of the euro causes a rise in the expected value of consumption in both the US and
Europe, and a rise in welfare. This result holds whether the pre-euro situation was one of
fixed exchange rates or floating exchange rates, within the European economies.
There are substantial additional implications of the euro that could be explored within
the same type of model.  Clearly, a substantial change in the currency of pricing may have
important business cycle consequences.  Betts and Devereux (1999) show how changes in
price setting can alter international macroeconomic transmission in substantial ways.  The
main point that we wish to make in this paper is that there may be important and previously
unforseen consequences of the European single currency, when we take account of the
potential endogeneity of the currency of price setting in a world of sticky prices.27
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Appendix  to M. B. Devereux, C. Engel, and C. Tille:
“Exchange Rate Pass-through and the Effects of the Euro”
A. Retailers’ price setting
Before the euro
The representative US retailer chooses prices in US dollar for domestic brands,
) ( 11 v P
dol
t , and imported brands,  ) ( 12 v P
dol
t . The goods are purchased from the manufacturers
at a unit cost of  ) ( 11 v Q
dol
t  US dollar for a domestic brand, and  ) ( 12 v Q
eur
t  units of European
currency for a European brand. The retailer incurs no additional extra cost. Using (1.2)
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t t t P C P C d
ρ ρ β . The retail market being competitive, the above
expected profits are equal to zero. This implies that the expected profits on each brand are
zero. If not, another retailer would enter the market and focus solely on the brand where
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The retail price of a domestic brand is equal to its wholesale price, and the retail price of an
imported brand is equal to the wholesale price in foreign currency, times the expected exchange
rate adjusted for the marginal utility of income.2
The representative European retailer sells domestic brands, for which she chooses
a retail price in European currency,  ) ( 22 v P
eur
t , and pays a wholesale price in European
currency, ) ( 22 v Q
eur
t . She also sells imported brands, for which she pays a wholesale price
in US dollar,  ) ( 21 v Q
dol
t . As explained in the text, she sets the retail price in US dollar,
) ( 21 v P
dol
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t t t P C P C d
ρ ρ β . The expected zero profit condition for each brand
implies that the retailer simply passes the wholesale price through to consumers:










The situation of the representative US retailer isn’t changed, and her prices are
given by (A.1). The European retailer now sets the retail price of imported brands in euro,
) ( 21 v P
eur
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The retail prices are then computed as:
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B. Firms’ price setting
Before the euro
A US firm chooses two wholesale prices in US dollar:  ) ( 11 v Q
dol
t  for sales to
domestic retailers and  ) ( 21 v Q
dol
t  for exports. Using (1.7), (1.8), (A.1) and (A.2), the
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Recalling that  ) ( 11 v Q
dol
t , ) ( 21 v Q
dol
t  and the variables for time t-1 are not affected by time t
shocks, the first order condition with respect to  ) ( 11 v Q
dol


























which corresponds to equation (1.9). Turning to  ) ( 21 v Q
dol
t , we recall that the situation is
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A European firm chooses two wholesale prices in European currency, one for
exports, ) ( 12 v Q
eur
t , and one for sales to domestic retailers,  ) ( 22 v Q
eur
t . Using (A.1) and (A.2),
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Recalling that in equilibrium all firms make the same choice, the first order condition
with respect to  ) ( 12 v Q
eur
t  is written as:
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From the first order condition with respect to  ) ( 22 v Q
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The introduction of the euro does not change the situation of European firms, and
(B.3) and (B.4) remain valid. A US firm however faces a different situation, as the5
European retailers to whom its goods are sent now set the retail prices in Euro. The
wholesale price for domestic sales is still given by (B.1), whereas the wholesale price for
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To derive equation (2.6), we use the labor supply relation (1.6) to write
ρ η t
dol
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To get equation (2.7), we rewrite equation (B.2) recalling that 
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Similarly, we use 
ρ η t
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(2.6) and (2.7) can be linearized to derive the expected consumption. We recall
the property of the log-normal distribution:
] exp[ ] [ ) , ( ) ln(
2 2
2
1 2 σ µ σ µ a a X E N X x
a + = ⇒ → =
(2.6) can then be written as:
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− − = Φ . Following similar steps, (2.7) can be rewritten after some
algebra as:
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From (2.2) and (2.4), we know that 
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Expected US consumption can be obtained from (B.1) and (B.3) which remain
valid after the introduction of the euro. Following the same steps as above, we show that
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Turning to European consumption, we use the labor supply (1.6) to write 
ρ η t
eur
t t C P W 2 2 2 =
and 










































which is similar to (C.1). Following similar steps as for the US, we derive:
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We derive the expected employment levels by combining (1.13) with our
solutions for retail prices (1.9)-(1.12), the labor supply (1.6) and the optimal risk sharing
condition (1.4). Expected employment in the United States is computed as:
] ) 1 ( [
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Turning to expected European employment, we write:
] ) 1 ( [
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We undertake similar steps, replacing (1.10) by (1.14) and using (1.15) for US
employment. European employment is computed as above, whereas US employment is
given by:
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Expected employment is always the same across regions, and is always given by the
same formula. Of course, the value of the terms in the formula is not the same before and
after the euro.9
E. Welfare
In our setup, the real effects of monetary shocks occur entirely in the short run.
From (1.1) and (2.9), we write the expected per capita welfare in country i as (omitting
the real balances):
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Simple algebra leads to equations (31.)-(3.2).
F. The law of one price for US exports
This Appendix derives a version of the model where US firms are constrained to
set the same US dollar wholesale price for domestic sales and exports before the




t = ). (2.3) and (2.4) remain valid, and the pre-
euro consumption volatility is still given by Table 2. The post-euro setup is identical as
before, and the pre-euro analysis of European firm is unchanged.10
Price setting
The situation of the retailers is unchanged, and they set their prices as in
Appendix A. A US firm chooses a unique US dollar wholesale price,  ) ( 11 v Q
dol
t , charged to
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The first order condition can be written as:
] ) 1 ( [ ) (
] ) 1 ( [ ) (
1
) (
2 2 12 1 1
1
1 1 1
2 2 12 1 1
1



















C P S n C nP P C E














Using the optimal risk sharing condition (1.4) we write:
(F.1)
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Expected consumption
We use the labor supply in the United States (1.6) to write 
ρ η t
dol
t t C P W 1 1 1 = , and
combine it with (F.1) to get:
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From Appendix C, we know that 
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which determines US consumption. To obtain the corresponding equation for European
consumption, we start by combining (F.1) with the labor supply (
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From Appendix C we know that 
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(F.2) and (F.3) are non-linear in logs, but can be approximated as a first order expansion around a
steady state with zero volatility. The numerator of the first term in (F.2) can be approximated as:
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The numerator of the first component of (F.3) can be approximated as follows:
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which allows us to take a log linear approximation of (F.3) as:13
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Expected employment
Expected US employment can be computed as:
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which is of the same form as in (2.9) in the baseline model. Table 3 presents the values of
expected consumption, employment, and ‘power’ consumption under the alternative
setup.
G. Exchange rate flexibility in pre-euro Europe14
In this extension, we assume that before the introduction of the euro, the exchange
rate between the French franc and the Deutsche Mark floats. The post-euro situation is
unchanged from the baseline model. We assume that European retailers entirely pass the
exchange rate fluctuations through to consumers. The retail prices in Germany and
France are therefore equal to the wholesales prices charged by the producer, times the
relevant exchange rate. The household problem is similar as the one presented in section
1.1, with the consumption basket now defined as:
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The analysis of the model is similar to the one presented in the main text. Assuming
i i ∀ =   µ µ  for simplicity, we can show that 
1
1 1
− = it t it M M S  for  = i 2, 3. Consumption in
the United States is still given by (2.3). As there is complete exchange rate pass-through
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From (G.1), we can compute the consumption volatility. It is equal to its value in Table 2


















We now turn to the optimal price setting for each firm. A US firm sets its
wholesale prices in US dollar, without any constraint of their being equalized across15
markets. Retailers in US and Europe then simply pass the wholesale prices through to
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A German firm sets three wholesale prices in DM: one for its sales to the US,  ) ( 12 v Q
DM
t ,
one for its sales in Germany,  ) ( 22 v Q
DM
t , and one for its sales to France,  ) ( 32 v Q
DM
t . The retail price
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From the solutions for 
dol
t P 11 , 
dol
t P 12  and 
dol
t P 13  we can establish that US expected
consumption is still given by (2.6). As US actual consumption is still determined by (2.3),
its variance is identical as in the baseline model. It is then straightforward to show that
the pre-euro expected US consumption is given by Table 2, and is therefore unaffected by
the intra-European exchange rate regime.
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which implies:
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which implies:
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From (G.2)-(G.3)-(G.4), expected consumption is the same in Germany and in France, as
is consumption volatility. From the optimal prices we then conclude that the law of one
price holds at the intra-European level, i.e. the French Franc price is the same for sales in
France and exports to Germany. This implies that PPP holds at the intra-European level,
and (1.4) implies that consumption is always the same in France and Germany.
In addition, we can show that expected employment in France and Germany is given by
(2.9). Table 4 presents the values of expected consumption, employment, and ‘power’
consumption under the alternative setup.
H. Alternative assumptions regarding the currency of pricing
The baseline analysis assumes that the introduction of the euro leads to a change
of pricing behavior for European importers, making the European retail prices less
sensitive to fluctuations in the exchange rate. However, it could be the case that European
importers do not change their pricing practice but US importers adjust theirs and pass
exchange rate fluctuations through to consumers. Under this alternative, consumer prices19
in the United States can change due to the exchange rate fluctuations US and European
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Retailers set the retail prices to be equal to the wholesale prices, adjusted by the
exchange rate. The situation for a US producer is unchanged by the euro, and the optimal
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Taking logs, we obtain:
(H.3)
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Turning to European consumption, (2.7) remains valid and we write:
(H.4)
2 2



























From (H.2)-(H.3)-(H.4), we see that expected consumption is the same in the US and
Europe. This implies that the law of one price holds, as the US dollar price set by a US
firm is the same for domestic sales and exports. We can show that expected employment
is the same in both regions and is given by (2.9). Table 5 presents the values of expected
consumption, employment, and ‘power’ consumption under the alternative setup.